
Financial regulatory reform is poised to emerge in a form that risks being just more of the same, if clear segmentation of oversight duties is not set-out in bright line separation of duties. Says
Pat O’Mara, CEO of New York’s
Cardinal Compliance Services (www.cardinalcompliance.com), “Instead of more ambiguity there must be a clear road-map for industry professionals to follow, outlining all specific regulatory responsibilities.”
‘Shooting the Messenger’ and SEC and FINRA BackgroundArguably, Mary Shapiro, as head of NASD (having once been head of the CFTC) was on the right track at the NASD when it changed to FINRA. Because of Madoff and Stanford, FINRA (the SEC’s primary Self Regulatory Organization), the lethargic attention of the U.S. Congress only recently began looking at capital markets regulatory structure, mandate and budget. Now that it’s awakened from its stupor, hopefully Congress does not resort to a ‘shoot-the-messenger’ approach. The State Securities Administrators rightly conclude that the SEC (and FINRA should be included here as well), are over-taxed with work, underfunded, and out-manned by those they are trying to regulate. But more regulation by the States is not the answer.
SEC Commissioner Shapiro’s VisionNot unlike Europe, particularly the UK, the NASD, was thinking globally. In its merger, or takeover of the New York Stock Exchange’s regulatory body, essentially the NYSE, the NASD sought an approach that could poise the new self regulatory organization (one “SRO” from what was once two SROs), into an “Authority” (hence the name ‘Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority’, or FINRA), that could address all securities related issues in the United States, while allowing for increased international reach of the broker-dealers it is responsible for regulating. Though no super-model of regulatory perfection, Europe at least has the notion of a regulatory ‘authority’ which conveys just that, a regulatory body that has the authority to permit, shut down, discipline, fine, sanction and otherwise, effectively regulate. Drawn from a capital markets trade execution level, on up, the Financial Services Authority in London, has gained a reputable track-record of effective regulation. This concept is clearly what was on the mind of Shapiro and others at the time of the NYSE and NASD merger. In this day and time, we should not go back to a provincial system of delegating some securities regulation to the state level, and the rest to the national level. After all, it is the 21st century and what’s more, the States seem themselves to be mired in their own financial crisis, not to mention, that from one State to another, the States are far too fragmented to regulate securities commerce which almost always crosses state borders (as well as national borders).
SEC and FINRA Mandate and CapabilitiesIn the cases of Stanford and Madoff, clearly existing regulation should have been brought to bear in full measure. The recent report concerning the missed opportunities in bringing the two scoundrels to justice shows that a simple upgrade to capabilities (e.g., to examination staff-qualifications, training, pay and experience) would have nipped the fraudulent schemes in the proverbial bud. All regulation was properly in place… in writing – statute, rules, regulation, petition, arbitration, down to enforcement and Wells Submissions – all are still a legitimate process designed to find and prosecute wrongdoing in the financial capital markets. Such process gets little recognition when it runs smoothly and flushes out many of the scam artists, and even the wrongdoers who may unwittingly ‘step-over-the-line’. (One should read the monthly enforcement notices and bulletins that are published regularly in this highly regulated industry). In fact, with the proper funding, training, and personnel expertise, and coordination among entities, the argument can be made that the existing regulatory system would have caught Madoff and Stanford quickly in the due course of regulatory examination and scrutiny. SEC and FINRA mandates are incredibly well written and with the proper intention and would be impossible to duplicate today, if Congress sought to somehow go back to the drawing board. What was shown to be lacking however, was a basic lack of shear capability to execute their mandate. Such funding and willingness to regulate has to come from…that’s right, the U.S. Congress. Congress should look directly into the mirror if they seek to isolate the true cause of any regulatory failure in the Capital Markets.
Banking Crisis effect on U.S. Capital MarketsJust a couple of years after Shapiro and the broker-dealer community constituted the new ‘FINRA’ regulatory body (out of the NYSE and NASD), we fast forward to March of 2008, and Bear Stearns, with its primary businesses that of a broker-dealer, as it teeters on the brink of collapse. With the case of Bear Stern we can see that, from a timing standpoint, broker-dealer regulation showed its preeminence in having flagged an institution's shortcomings, early on in the overall financial crisis. Because of Bear Stern’s ‘early warning’ requirement, pursuant to SEC rules, regulators knew it was in trouble. What should be understood is the effectiveness of SEC Rule 15(c) in obligating a broker-dealer institution to rigorous net capital requirements. Unable to meet such requirements, Bear Sterns had to notify regulators and of course we know the rest of story. Further, it could be said that it was because of looser standards in the banking arena, that Goldman Sachs and others quickly converted from broker-dealer investment banks, to commercial bank status, organizing themselves under Federal Reserve jurisdiction. Shortly after the Bear Sterns debacle (which took place under the watch of the prior SEC Commission Chairperson), an unprecedented decision was made. Investment Banks were allowed to temporarily borrow at the Federal Reserve Discount Rate. The real lesson to be taken is that it was the more nebulous approach to regulation that existed in the world of bank regulation (even of the products in which Bear Sterns was dealing) that is clearly seen to be at fault in the recent economic crisis. The questionable application of how banking products were valued (and thus what rules and oversight were applicable) is truly what needs to be reformed.
Concluding RecommendationsThe broker-dealer and managed funds regulatory world should continue to follow an SEC rule making methodology that garners industry consensus (because the honest brokers and managers will always seek a level playing field), and self regulation is effective, as long as rules are rigorously applied and vigorously enforced. Congress should ensure that in its approach to hedge fund advisers, broker-dealers and money-managers, at all levels, they all fall under the SEC’s jurisdiction. From a regulatory standpoint, parsing the securities community based on size or product would only fragment a regulatory system that already suffers from a lack of communication among the existing departmental silos that have set-up, by mandate. SEC enforcement should, if anything, be given more range (i.e., of everything securities related, perhaps even more insurance products) along with a staff and a budget that would make all of the Madoff want-a-be’s cringe and cower at the thought. Few ever successfully challenge an SEC enforcement action. As for honest capital markets professionals, we should all be concerned with the morass of banking reform legislation, seek that it not pervert capital markets legislation, and welcome the leveling-of-the-field-of-play with a beefed-up SEC and FINRA.